Motion of Defendant Roe 2 for Judgment on the Pleadings
For Plaintiffs John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and John Doe 3: John B. Richards; Timothy
C. Hale, Nye, Sterling, Hale, Miller & Sweet, LLP
For Defendant Roe 2: Craig Price, John C. Eck, Austin S. Payne, Griffith &
Thornburgh, LLP; Eric J. Bengtson, Davis, Bengtson & Young, APLC
RULING:
For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of Defendant Roe 2 for judgment on the pleadings is denied.
As alleged in the first amended complaint (FAC):
Defendant Roe 1 was the principal at a public elementary school owned by Defendant Roe 2 and located in Santa Barbara County, California. (FAC, ¶¶ GN-1 [first cause of action], Prem.L-3 & L-5.a [second cause of action], IT-1 [third and fourth causes of action].) Between 1972 and 1976, during the time Roe 1 was employed as a principal at the school owned by Roe 2, Roe 1 engaged in repeated acts of exhibitionism, fondling, masturbation, and oral copulation against Plaintiffs John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and John Doe 3. (FAC, ¶¶ GN-1 [first cause of action], Prem.L-1 [second cause of action], IT-1 [third and fourth causes of action].) When the alleged sexual abuse by Roe 1 occurred, Plaintiffs were minor students at the school. (FAC, ¶¶ GN-1 [first cause of action], Prem.L-1 [second cause of action], IT-1 [third and fourth causes of action].) Other employees of Roe 2, including secretaries and a teacher, knew about the acts committed by Roe 1 but covered them up. (FAC, ¶¶ GN-1 [first cause of action], Prem.L-1 [second cause of action], IT-1 [third and fourth causes of action].)
On December 30, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this action.
On February 16, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their FAC. The FAC asserts causes of action for general negligence (first and fifth causes of action), premises liability (second and sixth causes of action), and intentional torts (third, fourth, seventh, and eighth causes of action) against Defendants Roe 1 (first, second, third, and fourth causes of action), Roe 2 (same), Roe 3 (fifth, sixth, seventh, and eight causes of action), and Roe 4 (same).
On May 4, 2023, Roe 2, a public elementary school, filed a demurrer and motion to strike portions of the FAC. On May 31, the Court sustained the demurrer of Roe 2 as to the second and fourth causes of action without leave to amend and otherwise overruled the demurrer. The Court also granted the motion of Roe 2 to strike portions of the FAC relating to claims for punitive damages.
On June 23, 2023, Roe 2 filed its answer to the FAC generally denying the allegations thereof and asserting 21 affirmative defenses.
On October 4, 2023, the Court set trial for June 26, 2024.
On October 17, 2023, Roe 2 filed this motion for judgment on the pleadings. Roe 2 argues that Statutes 2019, chapter 861, section 3 (referred to as “A.B. 218” or as “Assembly Bill 218” by the parties and herein), which amended Government Code section 905, subdivision (m), is unconstitutional as a gift of public funds. As discussed below, this amendment allows Plaintiffs’ claims to proceed.
The motion is opposed by Plaintiffs.
Analysis
“A party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (b)(1). “The motion provided for in this section may only be made on one of the following grounds: [¶] … [¶] (B) If the moving party is a Defendant, that either of the following conditions exist: [¶] … [¶] (ii) The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that Defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd, (c)(1)(B)(ii).) “The grounds for motion provided for in this section shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the Court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d).)
The FAC alleges conduct giving rise to the causes of action against Roe 2 occurred approximately between 1972 and 1976. (FAC, ¶ GN-1.) Government Code section 905 requires presentation of a claim for money against a local public entity with certain exceptions. Absent an exception, the time for presenting a claim would have long passed. (See Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a).) The amendments to Government Code section 905 by A.B. 218 created that exception. Roe 2 argues, however, that the amendments to section 905 are unconstitutional as a gift of public funds, and therefore the limitations existing prior to AB 218 apply to bar Plaintiffs’ action.
(1) History of Limitations
In order to understand the context in which Roe 2’s argument arises, it is useful to summarize the history of the Legislature’s efforts to permit otherwise stale childhood sexual abuse claims to be litigated on their merits. This history is helpfully recounted in Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201 (Shirk).
Prior to 1986, the applicable statute of limitations for sexual abuse was one year. (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 207.) “In 1986, the Legislature enacted [former Code of Civil Procedure] section 340.1, which expanded to three years the statute of limitations for sexual abuse by a relative or household member of a child under 14 years of age.” (Ibid.) “In 1994, the Legislature again amended section 340.1 by expressly providing that the 1990 amendments ‘apply to any action commenced on or after January 1, 1991, including any action otherwise barred by the period of limitations in effect prior to January 1, 1991, thereby reviving those causes of action which had lapsed or technically expired under the law existing prior to January 1, 1991.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
“In 1998, there was another amendment to section 340.1, acknowledging the liability of a ‘person or entity’ whose negligent or intentional acts were a ‘legal cause’ of a child’s sexual abuse. [Citation.] Causes of action against such persons or entities had to be brought before the victim’s 26th birthday.” (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 208.) In 1999, the Legislature again amended section 340.1, clarifying that its 1998 changes relating to the liability of nonabuser persons or entities were prospective—that is, its provisions applied only to actions begun on or after January 1, 1999, or if filed before that time, actions still pending as of that date, ‘including any action or causes of action which would have been barred by the laws in effect prior to January 1, 1999.’ [Citation.]
“In 2002, the Legislature yet again amended section 340.1, this time reviving for the calendar year 2003 those causes of action based on childhood sexual abuse brought against a person or an entity that had ‘reason to know’ or was ‘on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct.’ [Citation.] Thus, this change revived for the year 2003 those causes of action brought by Plaintiffs over the age of 26 years against nonabuser persons or entities that would otherwise have been time barred as of January 1, 2003, ‘solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired’ as of that date. [Citation.]” (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 208, italics omitted.)
In 2007, the California Supreme Court in Shirk addressed the issue of whether a claim that accrued in 1978-1979 against a school district and was revived from the bar of the statute of limitations by the 2002 amendment to section 340.1 was also revived from the timeliness bar in failing to file a government claim under Government Code section 911.2. (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 204, 207, 210.) After applying traditional principles of statutory interpretation, the Shirk Court determined that the 2002 amendments to section 340.1 did not supersede the time limitations for bringing a claim against a public entity, therefore barring the Shirk Plaintiff’s claim. (Id. at p. 213.) The Shirk Court noted: “Had the Legislature intended to also revive in subdivision (c) the claim presentation deadline under the government claims statute, it could have easily said so. It did not.” (Ibid.)
“In direct response to Shirk, the Legislature [in 2008] enacted [former] Government Code section 905, subdivision (m), which eliminate[d] the claim presentation requirement for ‘[c]laims made pursuant to Section 340.1 . for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse.’ [Citation.] This [2008 amendment] exemption applies to claims arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009.” (A.M. v. Ventura Unified School Dist. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1258.)
In 2017, the California Supreme Court revisited this issue in Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 903 (Rubenstein). In Rubenstein, the Plaintiff filed a claim with Defendant public entity alleging that from 1993 to 1994, when she was a high school student, her cross-country and track coach, who was Defendant’s employee, sexually molested her. (Id. at p. 905.) Again, applying principles of statutory interpretation, the Rubenstein Court found that the Plaintiff’s claim was untimely presented. (Ibid.)
“As noted, the claim must be presented ‘not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.’ [Citation.] A cause of action for childhood sexual molestation generally accrues at the time of the alleged molestation. [Citation.] Plaintiff could have sued at that time. We must decide whether the changes to section 340.1 caused her action to accrue later or to reaccrue at a later time. Shirk held the changes did not do so, at least for causes of action that had lapsed and been revived. But Plaintiff argues, and the Court of Appeal found, that a claim that had never lapsed did not accrue under section 340.1 until a later time.” (Rubenstein, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 910, italics omitted.) “We have distinguished between statutes that postpone the accrual date for an action and statutes that temporarily suspend the running of a statute of limitations without affecting the accrual date. In Cuadra v. Millan (1998) 17 Cal.4th 855, 864-865, disapproved on other grounds in Samuels v. Mix (1999) 22 Cal.4th 1, 16, fn. 4, we quoted Witkin as ‘correctly’ stating, ‘ “The statute [of limitations] may be tolled (i.e., its operation suspended) by various circumstances, events or acts.” [Citation.]’ We further explained, ‘Similarly, statutes and case law prescribe a number of rules postponing the accrual of a cause of action until a specified event occurs. Some judicial opinions loosely describe such rules as “tolling the statute of limitations,” but again Witkin puts it more accurately: “The foregoing rules of delayed accrual are to be distinguished from rules that, despite accrual of the cause of action, toll or suspend the running of the statute.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 910-911, italics and parallel citations omitted.)
“ ‘Keeping these principles in mind, we conclude that while section 340.1 extends the time during which an individual may commence a cause of action alleging childhood sexual abuse, it does not extend the time for accrual of that cause of action.’ [Citation]” (Rubenstein, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 911, italics omitted.) Because the time for commencement of the claims presentation period is based on the time of accrual, the Rubenstein Court determined that the Plaintiff’s claim was not timely presented. (Id. at p. 914.)
In addressing the 2008 amendments, the Rubenstein Court stated:
“Recent legislation in response to Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201, demonstrates that the Legislature, in amending the statutory scheme, has endeavored to take account of these policy concerns. … Government Code section 905 provides exceptions to the government claims requirement. The new subdivision (m) of that section added another exception: ‘Claims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse. This subdivision shall apply only to claims arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009.’ [Citation.] This amendment does not directly apply here. No one is arguing that the claim requirement does not apply to Plaintiff at all; instead, the parties are disputing whether her claim was timely under then-existing law. But the amendment shows that the Legislature has attempted to balance the important objectives underlying the statutory scheme with practical concerns about permitting the litigation of old claims against governmental entities.” (Rubenstein, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 914, parallel citations omitted.)
“The legislative history behind the new [2008] Government Code section 905, subdivision (m), makes clear the Legislature overruled Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201, only prospectively due to fiscal considerations. A committee report explained: ‘This bill is intended to address the Shirk decision by expressly providing that childhood sexual abuse actions against public entities are exempted from government tort claims requirements and the six-month notice requirement. It is identical to SB 1339 (Simitian), except that this bill applies prospectively only, to claims arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009. SB 1339 passed out of the Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously, but was held in suspense in the Senate Appropriations. The change from SB 1339 should reduce the bill’s financial impact on local public entities.’ [Citation.]” (Rubenstein, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 914–915, parallel citations omitted.)
“In this way, during the calendar year 2008, the Legislature put governmental entities on notice that for conduct allegedly occurring on or after January 1, 2009, they would have to protect themselves as best they could against possible stale claims. But the Legislature also intended to protect those entities from such claims for conduct occurring before that date. This legislative intent supports our conclusion that Plaintiff’s 2012 claim for conduct allegedly occurring from 1993 to 1994 was untimely.” (Rubenstein, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 915.)
“In July 2018, the Legislature adopted Senate Bill No. 1053 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), which amended section 935 by adding a new subdivision (f): ‘Any procedure authorized to be prescribed by this section does not apply to claims of childhood sexual abuse made as described in subdivision (m) of Section 905. This subdivision is declaratory of existing law.’ ” (Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 423 (Coats).)
“Then, on October 13, 2019, Assembly Bill No. 218 [(2019–2020 Reg. Sess.)] (Assembly Bill 218) was signed into law. Assembly Bill 218 significantly amended Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1. Among other things, it lengthened the time within which an action for damages resulting from ‘childhood sexual assault’ must be brought to 22 years from the date the Plaintiff attains the age of majority or five years from date the Plaintiff ‘discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault’ [citation]; it added a provision for recovery of treble damages from ‘a Defendant who is found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor’ [citation]; and it raised to 40 years the age for cut off of a Plaintiff’s ability to sue third party Defendants [citation].
“Two of the subdivisions added by Assembly Bill 218 are of direct relevance here. Subdivision (q) of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 provides: ‘Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described in paragraphs (1) through (3), inclusive, of subdivision (a) that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2020, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived, and these claims may be commenced within three years of January 1, 2020. A Plaintiff shall have the later of the three-year time period under this subdivision or the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that added this subdivision.[’] Subdivision (r) of the amended section 340.1, Code of Civil Procedure provides: ‘The changes made to the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that amended this subdivision in 2019 apply to and revive any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.’
“In addition to the changes to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, Assembly Bill 218 amended section 905 by deleting from subdivision (m) the language that previously limited this exception to the government claim presentation requirement to claims arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009, and adding subdivision (p), which made this change retroactive.” (Coats, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 423–424, fns. omitted.)
“In Assembly Bill 218, the Legislature has again attempted to balance the competing concerns of protecting public entities from stale claims and allowing victims of childhood sexual abuse to seek compensation. This time, the Legislature came to a different conclusion, with an express revival provision for claims against public entities as well as those against private Defendants.” (Coats, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 429.)
So, as now reads, Government Code section 905, subdivision (m) provides:
“There shall be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) all claims for money or damages against local public entities except any of the following: [¶] … [¶] (m) Claims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault.”
Moreover, “The changes made to this section by the act that added this subdivision [i.e., A.B. 218,] are retroactive and apply to any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.” (Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (p).)
The plain language of subdivisions (m) and (p) lead to the presently undisputed conclusion that, as a matter of statutory interpretation of current law, the failure to present a timely government claim would not be a bar to Plaintiffs’ maintaining their action.
(2) Gift of Public Funds
Roe 2 argues that A.B. 218 is unconstitutional insofar as it revives a cause of action for which a timely government claim had not been filed when the action accrued. The constitutional conflict asserted by Roe 2 is the gift of public funds doctrine:
“The Legislature shall have no power to give or to lend, or to authorize the giving or lending, of the credit of the State …; nor shall it have power to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation whatever ….” (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 6.)
“The term ‘gift’ in the constitutional provision ‘includes all appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or enforceable claim,’ even if there is a moral or equitable obligation. [Citation.] ‘An appropriation of money by the legislature for the relief of one who has no legal claim therefor must be regarded as a gift within the meaning of that term, as used in this section, and it is none the less a gift that a sufficient motive appears for its appropriation, if the motive does not rest upon a valid consideration.’ [Citation.]” (Jordan v. California Dept. of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 450 (Jordan).)
“It is well settled that, in determining whether an appropriation of public funds or property is to be considered a gift, the primary question is whether the funds are to be used for a ‘public’ or a ‘private’ purpose. If they are for a ‘public purpose’, they are not a gift within the meaning of [former] section 31 of article IV[, current section 6 of article XVI]. [Citations.] The benefit to the state from an expenditure for a ‘public purpose’ is in the nature of consideration and the funds expended are therefore not a gift even though private persons are benefited therefrom.” (Alameda County v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276, 281 (Janssen).)
(4) Does A.B. 218 Unconstitutionally Gift Public Funds?
Roe 2 argues: “By removing the claims presentation requirement retroactively, the legislature removed the substantive claim presentation element for a cause of action for childhood sexual assault against public entities. That action ostensibly created an enforceable claim for past acts where none previously existed. This equates to the legislature creating liability against the state for past acts of negligence, ‘something it could not do,’ according to the Supreme Court in [Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507 (Heron)].
In Heron, the issue was the validity of the Legislature’s enactment as follows: “The Legislature, at its last session, added a new section to the Civil Code ([former] section 1714 1/2, [Stats. 1929, ch. 260, § 1, pp. 565-566]) making the state and certain designated political subdivisions owning any motor vehicles responsible to persons sustaining damage by reason of death or injury to person or property as the result of the negligent operation of such motor vehicles by any officer, agent, or employee, or as the result of the negligent operation of any other motor vehicle by any officer, agent, or employee when acting within the scope of his office, agency, or employment. Such damaged person may now sue the state or political subdivision in any Court of competent jurisdiction in this state in the manner directed by law. In case of a recovery under the provisions of the section, the state or appropriate subdivision is subrogated to the rights of the person injured, and may, in turn, recover from the officer, agent, or employee causing the damage the amount of any judgment recovered against the state or subdivision in the damage suit. The state and the designated political subdivisions are authorized by the provisions of the act to insure their liability in any insurance company permitted to transact the business of such insurance in the state of California, and the premiums for such insurance shall be a proper charge against the respective general funds of the state or subdivision.” (Heron, supra, 209 Cal. at p. 514.) The petitioner argued, among other things, that act was invalid as a gift of public funds. (Id. at pp. 516-517.) The Heron Court rejected this argument:
“We are not strongly impressed with the contention of the respondent that the application of funds to pay judgments obtained against the state constitutes a gift of public money, within the prohibition of the Constitution. The state cannot be subjected to suits against itself except by its express consent; but it may surrender its sovereignty in that particular. It has done so in this instance through the act of its duly authorized representative, the Legislature. The judgments which are to be paid bear no semblance to gifts. They must be first obtained in Courts of competent jurisdiction, to which the parties have submitted their claims in the manner directed by law. In other words, they are judgments obtained after the requirements of due process of law have been complied with. The Legislature has not attempted to create a liability against the state for any past acts of negligence on the part of its officers, agents or employees—something it could not do, and the doing of which would, in effect, be the making of a gift—but has provided that ‘hereafter’ it shall be liable for certain things done which cause damage to its citizens, its liability to be first determined by an appropriate action at law.” (Heron, supra, 209 Cal. at p. 517.)
In making its argument, Roe 2 points to the parenthetical phase “something it could not do, and the doing of which would, in effect be the making of a gift” as determinative. However, as the Heron Court’s language indicates, because the Legislature was not creating a public liability for past acts, the Heron Court did not determine what requirements must be met in order for the Legislature to create such liability.
There is an inherent tension between the dicta in Heron suggesting that the Legislature could not provide liability for past acts of negligence and the dicta in Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at page 203, that the Legislature could revive a claim barred by the claim presentation deadline by easily saying so. In Coats, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th 415, the Defendant district argued that A.B. 218 was unconstitutionally retroactive because of the prohibition against ex post facto laws and because of due process guaranties. The Coats Court noted that it was clearly settled that the Legislature had the power to revive a civil cause of action by retroactive extension of the statute of limitations:
“ ‘[T]he Legislature has the power to expressly revive time-barred civil common law causes of action. This holding is consistent with the niche in our civil law occupied by statutes of limitations. “The principle is . well established that ‘[s]tatutorily imposed limitations on actions are technical defenses which should be strictly construed to avoid the forfeiture of a Plaintiff’s rights. ’ [Citation.] [T]here is a ‘strong public policy that litigation be disposed of on the merits wherever possible.’ ” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Coats, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 428.)
The Coats Court noted the differences between a statute of limitations and a claims presentation deadline: “Rubenstein noted that the claim presentation requirement ‘ “is based on a recognition of the special status of public entities, according them greater protections than nonpublic entity Defendants, because unlike nonpublic Defendants, public entities whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused harm will incur costs that must ultimately be borne by the taxpayers.” ’ [Citation.]” (Coats, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 428–429.) The Coats Court remarked: “But we are aware of no reason the Legislature should be any less able to revive claims in this context, as it expressly did in Assembly Bill 218 ….” (Id. at p. 428.) The Coats Court did not, however, address the specific constitutional issue raised here.
Putting aside the question of whether permitting an action to proceed on the merits notwithstanding a previously lapsed claim presentation constitutes an “appropriation of public funds” within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition, the second element of public purpose resolves the issue here.
“It is generally held that in determining whether an appropriation of public funds is to be considered a gift, the primary question is whether the funds are to be used for a ‘public’ or ‘private’ purpose; the benefit to the state from an expenditure for a public purpose is in the nature of consideration and the funds expended are therefore not a gift even though private persons are benefited therefrom. [Citations.] The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature to determine, and its discretion will not be disturbed by the Courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis.” (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 745–746; accord, Martin v. Santa Clara Unified School Dist. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 241, 254.)
There is an “important state interest” in “the increased availability of tort relief to Plaintiffs who had been the victims of sexual abuse while a minor.” (Liebig v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 828, 834.) “[T]he identification of public policy can be as much an interpretive as an evidentiary exercise.” (Ibid.)
There is a clear public policy purpose evident in A.B. 218’s revival of actions otherwise barred by a lapsed government claim presentation deadline. The statutory history, detailed above, of amendments to both the statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 and the claim presentation requirements of Government Code sections 905 demonstrate an evolving policy of exposing past government malfeasance with respect to the prevention of childhood sexual assault and enhancing the deterrent effect of such malfeasance through compensation. As the Coats Court stated, in A.B. 218, the Legislature again balanced competing policy concerns and reached a different conclusion than the earlier policy balance as discussed in Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201, and Rubenstein, supra, 3 Cal.5th 903. (Coats, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 429; see also Liebig v. Superior Court, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 834 [finding the “language of the retroactivity provision of section 340.1 indicates a clear legislative intent to maximize claims of sexual-abuse minor Plaintiffs for as expansive a period of time as possible”].)
This public policy purpose is also expressed in the legislative history of A.B. 218:
“Childhood sexual abuse continues to ruin children lives and continues to shock the nation because, unfortunately, perpetrators continue to abuse, often with impunity, and sometimes with the help of third parties who either choose not to get involved or actively cover-up the abuse. Whether the abuse occurred through gymnastics, swimming, school, or a religious institution, too many children have been victims of abuse and their lives have been forever impacted by that abuse. Despite the lifetime of damage that this abuse causes its victims, the state’s statute of limitations restricts how long actions can be brought to recover for damages caused by childhood sexual abuse. In an effort to allow more victims of childhood sexual assault to be compensated for their injuries and, to help prevent future assaults by raising the costs for this abuse, this bill extends the civil statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault by 14 years, revives old claims for three years, and eliminates existing limitations for claims against public institutions. This bill applies equally to abuse occurring at public and private schools and applies to all local public entities.” (Assem. Floor Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 30, 2019, pp. 1-2.)
“AB 218 would expand access to justice for victims of childhood sexual assault by removing the arbitrary time limits upon victims to pursue a case. Several states have already taken this step and have eliminated the civil statute of limitations for these cases. There should not be a reasonable expectation that if simply enough time passes, there will be no accountability for these despicable past acts by individuals and entities. This bill ensures that ‘time’s up’ for the perpetrators of childhood sexual assault, not for victims.” (Assem. Floor Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 218, supra, p. 2.)
In support of its motion, Roe 2 cites Conlin v. Board of Sup’rs of City and County of San Francisco (1893) 99 Cal. 17 (Conlin), Orange County Foundation v. Irvine Co. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 195 (OC Foundation), and Jordan, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th 431, for the proposition that no public purpose exists where claims are unenforceable. In Conlin, the Legislature passed a statute directing San Francisco to pay $54,015.37 on a contract for work done on public streets that had not been paid. (Conlin, supra, 99 Cal. at pp. 19-20.) In holding the statute as requiring an unconstitutional gift of public funds, the Conlin Court stated: “An appropriation of money by the legislature for the relief of one who has no legal claim therefor must be regarded as a gift within the meaning of that term, as used in this section, and it is none the less a gift that a sufficient motive appears for its appropriation, if the motive does not rest upon a valid consideration.” (Id. at p. 22.)
In OC Foundation, the State had settled a dispute over title to three islands in upper Newport Bay with a private company paying money to the private company. (OC Foundation, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at pp. 198-199.) The OC Foundation Court first noted as correct the proposition that “the relinquishment of a colorable legal claim in return for settlement funds paid by the State is good consideration and accomplishes a valid public purpose.” (Id. at p. 200.) However, “[c]ompromise of a wholly invalid claim is inadequate consideration to support a contract. [Citations.] We hold that, when state funds are expended pursuant to a settlement agreement in exchange for the relinquishment of such a claim, no ‘public purpose’ is achieved. Such an expenditure violates the gift clause.” (Id. at p. 201.) Because there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the private company knew that it had no claim, the OC Foundation Court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the private company Defendant. (Id. at pp. 200-201.)
In Jordan, the Legislature had by statute authorized approximately $18 million as the maximum amount of attorney fees that could be awarded in connection with a lawsuit involving the state’s smog impact fee. (Jordan, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 438-439.) The attorneys entered into an agreement with the State to arbitrate the amount of attorney fees. (Id. at pp. 440-441.) The arbitration panel determined that the case was a common fund case and awarded over $88 million in attorney fees. (Id. at p. 441.) On appeal of the trial Court’s order vacating the attorney fee award, the Jordan Court held that the common fund doctrine was not available as a basis for the attorney fee award and that the authority to arbitrate was also statutory. (Id. at pp. 444, 449-450.) As such, the amount awarded exceeding the $18 million authorized by statute would be an unconstitutional gift of public funds. (Id. at p. 450.)
In each of Conlin, OC Foundation, and Jordan, the payment at issue was made in the context of a unique transaction for which the respective Court could identify no public purpose. Here, in reviving claims for which the government claim period had elapsed, the Legislature has identified an issue of statewide importance with prospective implications and acted pursuant to its chosen public policy. Based upon all of the foregoing, this Court cannot say as a matter of law that A.B. 218 is “devoid of legislative purpose.” (See Martin v. Santa Clara Unified School Dist., supra, Cal.App.4th at p. 254.)
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Roe 2 has not shown that Plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action based upon their failure to timely comply with the government claim presentation requirements applicable to their causes of action. The motion for judgment on the pleadings will therefore be denied.
(5) Requests for Judicial Notice
In support of the motion, Roe 2 requests that the Court take judicial notice of: (Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice, exhibit 1) the Order after Hearing, filed June 13, 2023, in Doe v. Acalanes Union High School, Contra Costa County Superior Court case number C22-02613; (exhibit 2) the minute order, filed October 2, 2023, in Doe C.W. v. Does, Contra Costa County Superior Court case number C22-02488; (exhibit 3) the Order re: Demurrer and Motion to Strike, filed July 14, 2021, in Doe v. Los Gatos-Saratoga Union High School, Santa Clara County Superior Court case number 21CV376542; and (exhibit 4) the Assembly Floor Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended August 30, 2019.
With respect to exhibit 4, the Court grants the request for judicial notice of this legislative history report. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).)
With respect to exhibits 1 through 3, the documents are decisions of California Superior Courts. The purpose of the request is for their persuasive value both on the merits (e.g., Motion, at p. 17) and to suggest the existence of a conflict in authority (Motion, at p. 8, fn. 3). “A trial Court judgment cannot properly be cited in support of a legal argument, absent exceptions not applicable here.” (San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. v. County of San Diego (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1184; accord, Santa Ana Hospital Medical Center v. Belshe (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 831.) The superior Court orders therefore cannot be used for their persuasive value as to legal argument and correspondingly do not create any conflict in authority. These requests for judicial notice will be denied. (See Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 [only relevant material subject to judicial notice].) Roe 2’s improper references to uncitable superior Court orders constitute conduct for which the Court could consider the imposition of sanctions, but given the context in which this arises, the Court disregards these superior Court orders in making this ruling.
In opposition to the motion, Plaintiffs request that the Court take judicial notice of: (Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice, exhibit 1) the Senate Rules Committee, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended March 25, 2019; (exhibit 2) the Assembly Floor Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended August 30, 2019; (exhibit 3) the Assembly Floor Analysis, 3d reading analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.); (exhibit 4) the Assembly Committee on Judiciary, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2022 Reg. Sess.) as introduced January 16, 2019; (exhibit 5) the Senate Committee on Appropriations, analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended March 25, 2019; and (exhibit 6) “various orders” of California superior Courts.
As to exhibits 1 through 5, the Court grants the requests for judicial notice of these legislative history reports. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).) As to exhibit 6, the request for judicial notice is denied for the same reasons discussed above with respect to trial Court orders. The Court similarly disregards the superior Court orders in making this ruling.